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Zhang Wei*
伴随中国物权法与民法典的制定，海峡两岸对物权法定原则质疑日渐增多，这促使我们重新审
视物权法定的一些理论问题。本文运用经济分析方法，从信息成本外部化与挫折成本这两个方面探
讨物权法定以及物权自由的成本—效益问题。由此得出结论：物权法定的挫折成本主要源自法律对
物权、债权的不同救济方式，而物权自由的信息成本外部化则是局部性的。因此，在规范上，推翻
物权法定不是降低挫折成本的唯一途径，而信息成本外部化也不必然要求否定物权自由。
I. Introduction
Numerus clausus refers to the principle
that both the form and the substance of a
property right shall be prescribed by the law,
which essentially restricts the freedom to
“customize” the legally enforceable property
interests.2 It has long been regarded as a ba-
sic principle in Civil Law countries, while
the recent studies of U.S. scholars suggest
that its essence exists in the Anglo-Ameri-
can law as well.3
In the ongoing legislative process of the
Chinese Property Law and the Civil Code,
however, the numerus clausus principle is
increasingly called into question by Chinese
writers from both sides of the Taiwan
Straits. Yet those who advocate an entire or
partial abolition of this principle fail to spell
out the exact meaning of the “freedom of
property rights” which they are arguing for.
Absent numerus clausus, it is still possible to
set certain restrictions on the customization
of property rights just as contract law does
to the contractual arrangements between
private parties. Due to the vagueness of the
“freedom of property rights” concept, we
assume that the parties are totally free to
devise their property rights under a regime
without the numerus clausus principle in Part
II of this paper, and try to set up some limi-
tations on this freedom in Part III.
In this paper, we will explore the costs
and benefits of the numerus clausus principle
as well as a property regime without it, us-
ing an “information cost externality versus
frustration costs” framework.4 The paper is
centered on positive analysis elaborating the
possible consequences under each of the two
property regimes. We do not attempt to make
a direct choice for the policy-makers though
certain normative implications will be men-
tioned in Part III.
II. Information Cost Externality versus
Frustration Costs
NUMERUS CLAUSUS 41
1. Information cost externality
(1) Merrill and Smith’s theory
Merrill and Smith suggest that “(p)arties
who create new property rights will not take
into account the full magnitude of the mea-
surement costs they impose on strangers to
the title.”5 They point out three classes of
individuals who may potentially be affected
by the creation of idiosyncratic property
rights: 1) the originating parties, the partici-
pants to the transaction creating such new
rights; 2) the potential successors in interest,
those who will succeed the property inter-
ests from the originating parties; 3) the other
market participants. And the third class can
be further divided into two subclasses. In
the first are the individuals dealing with the
same type of assets as the one in which the
originating parties create new property rights.
The second subclass includes all other people
that do not transact with the above type of
assets yet must avoid violating property rights
in all these assets. Merrill and Smith offer
the following example to illustrate their idea.
A is the sole owner of a watch. He wants to
create a “time-share” in it, a fancy under the
current property law, and transfer this right
to B, which allows B to use the watch only
on Mondays. In this example, A and B are
the originating parties. Those who might
purchase A’s reserved rights in the watch
as well as who succeed to the interest ac-
quired by B are the potential successors in
interest, named respectively as Cs and Ds.
Anyone selling and purchasing rights in other
watches, Es and Fs, are in the first subclass
of the other market participants, while the
remaining market participants, identified as
Is and Js, make up the second.6
Merrill and Smith argue that no exter-
nality exists with respect to the originating
parties and the potential successors in inter-
est because any change in the value of the
interests resulting from the creation of new
property rights will be reflected in the deal-
ing prices among these parties. The infor-
mation cost externality, however, does af-
fect the other market participants. First, since
a legally permitted Monday-only property
right is created in A’s watch, for fear of
potential claims from third parties, F may
have to investigate whether the same right
exists in E’s watch which he is going to buy,
while E might also need to disclose to F
whether such right is in existence. These
costs of investigation and disclosure exter-
nalized to E  and F  come from the
customization of the nonstandard property
right between A and B. Second, concerned
about violating the new property right in A’s
watch, Is and Js will be obliged to collect
information about it as well. Again, these in-
formation costs are not to be borne by A or
B.7 In this paper, the externality arising among
the first subclass of other market participants,
such as E and F, is referred to as “the first
level information cost externality,” and the
externality affecting the second subclass,
i.e. Is and Js, as “the second level informa-
tion cost externality.” According to Merrill
and Smith, the numerus clausus principle, by
compulsory standardization of property
rights, is one way to control the externalized
information costs to third parties.
Let’s turn to the second level informa-
tion cost externality first. Do Is and Js nec-
essarily need to know about the new right in
A’s watch at additional costs in order to avoid
violating such a right? The answer should
be negative. Although property right is in
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rem, general market participants are charged
with no more than a duty of abstention.8 To
observe this duty, they do not need to know
who has a property right or what the right is.
Knowing that I do not have a right is
sufficient. Therefore, the second level ex-
ternality appears to be imaginary even under
a property regime without numerus clausus,9
provided that the ownership cannot be de-
vised freely and that nobody is allowed to
customize a property right beyond his power
as an owner. This point is convincingly il-
lustrated by the fact that we hardly, if ever,
consult the registration to avoid violating
other people’s rights in real estates in spite
of the existence of well organized land reg-
istration systems in both Common and Civil
Law countries. Only the current and poten-
tial holders of property rights (like A, B, and
C, D) will have the incentive to investigate
the substances of these rights.
As to the first level information cost
externality, it can be a real problem if there
is no legal protection for  bona fide
purchasers. As we see under modern prop-
erty regimes, however, bona fide purchas-
ers will rarely be obligated to honor the idio-
syncratic rights. So next we are trying to
analyze the first level information cost ex-
ternality with the bona fide purchaser pro-
tection rules in place.
(2) Taking the Bona Fide Purchaser Pro-
tection Rules into Account
The term “bona fide purchaser” can be
possibly interpreted in two ways. First, it may
refer to purchasers who do not have actual
notice of the encumbrances in assets. They
are not required to honor any unknown fancy
in the assets to be acquired, even if their ig-
norance results from negligence. If this
meaning is applied, then potential buyers do
not have to investigate the property rights in
the subject matter of purchase, while sellers
merely need to disclose nonstandard rights
when they do exist. In other words, in this
case, information costs incident to the cre-
ation of new property rights are completely
internalized by the originating parties. Using
Merrill and Smith’s illustration, we can find
that, in essence, there are only A, B, C, D in
the market but no E or F exists if all pur-
chasers without actual notice are protected
as bona fide purchasers.
Second, “bona fide purchaser” may also
be limited to the acquirers not only without
actual notice but also with no constructive
notice, i.e., those who do not know and
should not have known the fancies.10 Under
this interpretation, the occurrence of infor-
mation cost externality will turn on the dif-
ferent systems for information disclosure.
The information cost externality does
not arise in a decentralized disclosure sys-
tem where the originating parties disclose the
customized property rights on a one-on-one
basis. In such a system, the potential buyers
have but one way to obtain constructive
notice, namely, the direct disclosure by the
creator of the novel rights. Essentially, the
distribution of information costs among the
transacting parties remains identical in the
decentralized system, no matter how “bona
fide purchaser” is defined. In Merrill and
Smith’s example, this means that F will be
protected as a bona fide purchaser insofar
as E does not disclose the “time-share” in
his watch, and that E need not make any
disclosure unless his watch does bear such
an interest, yet the existence of a “time-share”
in A’s watch is totally irrelevant.
NUMERUS CLAUSUS 43
Things will change, however, in a cen-
tralized disclosure system. Real estate regis-
tration may be the most familiar paradigm of
a system where information is gathered and
disclosed collectively. Externality will become
a real issue if the information about a non-
standard property right is so released. Again,
we take Merrill and Smith’s “time-share” in
a watch as an example. Consider that the
“time-share” created by A is the first non-
standard property right in a watch and that it
must be disclosed by filing. This invention
brings about two kinds of information costs
that are not to be borne by A or B, the origi-
nating parties. One is the cost of establish-
ing a filing system for watches, including
the expenses for devising and maintaining this
system. The other is the information costs
incurred by potential buyers of all watches
in verifying the legal dimensions of the
property. When F wants to buy E’s watch,
he will have to check whether the novel right
exists in that watch by consulting its filing,
because F will assume any filed fancy in E’s
watch even without actual notice. The first
kind of externalized costs falls on the whole
society, and according to Hansmann and
Kraakman, this can be regarded as “system
costs”; the second kind, which is borne by
those who do not use the nonstandard prop-
erty right, parallels the “nonuser costs” in
their framework.11 Some writers argue that
with the development of computer and
internet technologies, costs involved in the
operation of filing systems tend to decrease
consistently, and therefore, the legal dimen-
sions of more assets can be disclosed col-
lectively through filing systems.12 Indeed, this
prospect seems highly credible, yet lawyers
may find difficulties in estimating the mag-
nitude of such decrease and may be con-
cerned about, among other things, the reli-
ability of network or the necessity of backup
in hard copies. It is the technical experts that
are more appropriate to make these
estimations. Above all, even though the mon-
etary costs for establishing and maintaining
filing systems reduce to zero, opportunity
costs are still unavoidable for those who
make or check filings and who keep the sys-
tem running. In this sense, technological
development is not bound to eliminate these
two kinds of externalities.
These externalized costs are distinct in
one aspect: after a new property right is cre-
ated in a particular type of assets thus giving
rise to the externalities, the marginal costs
will increase only insignificantly when a sec-
ond nonstandard right turns up, regardless
of whether the second right is in the same
category as the first one. Once a filing sys-
tem for watches is built up because of the
“time-share” coined in A’s watch, then the
“system costs” as well as the “nonuser
costs” have already sunk. These costs will
largely remain unchanged when another
“time-share” or a “place-share” is created in
E’s watch.13 As a result, the legal restric-
tions set on the forms of property rights have
a bipolar character for a given type of assets.
The law tends to either permit no exceptions
to the prescribed forms or provide for an
open-ended set of forms that can be cus-
tomized freely.14
Is it practical to internalize the above two
costs by charging fees?15 This may not be
an easy task. As stated above, even a single
nonstandard property right in a certain type
of assets will suffice to initiate almost the
entire “system costs” and “nonuser costs”
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if this right is to be disclosed in a centralized
system. Consequently, the externality can-
not be ruled out unless the fees charged to
the originator of such a right are equivalent
to the sum of these two kinds of costs. As a
practical matter, nevertheless, it appears un-
feasible to charge that high amount for one
filing. In addition, difficulties may also arise
concerning the appropriate compensation to
“nonusers” given that they are not entitled to
collect fees directly from those who make
filings. Free access to the filings alone will
not be sufficient as the nonusers’ transpor-
tation costs or even opportunity costs de-
serve compensation. Yet overcompensation
will probably lead to too many consultations
on filings. In fact, filing fees are usually
charged on a per-item basis or according to
the value of the subject matter to be filed,
which is indifferent to actual costs involved
in filing itself. These practices may arguably
be explained as a response to the many diffi-
culties in internalizing costs.
2. Frustration costs
Frustration costs are usually considered
to be the disutility originated from the fact
that mandatory rules sometimes prevent the
parties from achieving a legitimate goal cost-
effectively.16 For our purposes, frustration
costs are costs attributable to the numerus
clausus principle, and any goal unattainable
even under a regime without this principle
should not be counted as a source of frus-
tration costs. In this sense, frustration costs
may well be understood as the difference in
transaction costs of a given deal under a
numerus clausus regime and one without it.
(1) “Generative property right” theory
Mer rill  and Smith apply Noam
Chomsky’s Generative Grammar theory to
property law and believe that the generative
power of the system of property rights will
help lower the frustration costs. They com-
pare the inventory of property rights pre-
scribed by law to the lexicon of a language,
and the rules for combining property rights
to a language’s grammar. The parties can
tailor potentially infinite forms of property
rights in line with their transaction goals by
combining the standard property rights un-
der certain available rules.17 They further
argue that “a complex property rights built
from a small number of standard building
blocks is likely to be easier for third parties
to process than functionally equivalent com-
plex property rights for which third parties
must figure out the nature of the building
blocks.”18
The soundness of this “generative prop-
erty right” theory is nevertheless subject to
doubt in American law.19 Even if some new
property rights, such as a “tenancy for the
duration of the war,”20 can be generated, it
by no means warrants free customization of
any form of property rights. The feasibility
of generating depends ultimately on the na-
ture of the building blocks. For instance, it
seems hardly possible, using currently avail-
able estates, to imitate the right of entry and
create a future interest shifting the owner-
ship of land to a third party only upon his
choice of accepting the land.21
The generative theory can be more prob-
lematic in Civil Law countries. This is due to
the different ways of standardizing property
rights in American and Civil Law. The former
emphasizes restricting the forms, and leaves
space for customizing the substance of prop-
erty rights. The latter, on the other hand, lim-
its both the forms and the substance. In the
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Japanese Civil Code, for example, there are
three types of usufruct rights in land: the
superficies, the emphyteusis and the
easement. The substance of the first two
types is strictly defined, and the parties are
allowed to tailor the duration of rights only.
The easement is the only type that is rela-
tively open to customization, which is more
or less similar to equitable servitude in Ameri-
can law.22 Its non-possessory character and
dependency on titles of the dominant land
nevertheless confine the scope of its
application. Using Merrill and Smith’s anal-
ogy to language, we can say that the ease-
ment is like an uncommon word with a poor
potential for combination. In this sense, we
may draw an analogy between the standard-
ization of property rights in American law
and an algebraic expression with plenty of
variables while the standardization in Civil
Law is closer to an arithmetic expression
composed basically of constants. Against
such a legal background, it is more imprac-
tical to generate new types of property rights
out of the standard building blocks provided
by Civil Law.
(2) The analysis of frustration costs:
comparing the transaction costs under the
two regimes
We formulate the following example to
facilitate the analysis. A, the owner of a
watch, hopes to create a property right in
the watch and grant it to B. This will entitle
B to use the watch on Mondays during his
lifetime. Also, B may freely transfer this right
while he is alive. But the right reverts to A or
his successors upon B’s death.23 Under a
property regime without the numerus clausus
principle, A can set up the new property right
directly and convey it to B, while under a
numerus clausus regime, the parties will re-
sort to the contractual mechanism to achieve
this transaction.24 A comparison is made be-
low between the transaction costs of creat-
ing the property right directly and those re-
sorting to contractual arrangements.
First, we need to classify the transac-
tion costs to be compared. Usually, transac-
tion costs are divided into three categories:
search and information costs, bargaining and
decision costs, and police and enforcement
costs.25 The first category, the search and
information costs, is not closely relevant for
our purposes, because it is always neces-
sary for the parties to discover each other,
to investigate the creditability of their
partners, to disclose or search the physical
and legal characters of the watch, etc. The
legal devices they are utilizing do not affect
their costs of taking these actions. The
amount of the costs depends instead on such
non-legal factors as whether the relevant in-
formation is readily available in the particu-
lar market, and how well the parties know
each other. Therefore, we will dispense with
the search and information costs and focus
on the bargaining and decision costs, and the
police and enforcement costs.
Two aspects need to be considered when
we talk about the bargaining and decision
costs. One is the costs involved in the nego-
tiations determining the material rights and
duties of the parties. The other is the cost
spent documenting these rights and duties in
certain forms. The former does not vary with
the legal devices used to do the transaction.
The parties aim to realize the same business
objective regardless of the legal mechanism
they are utilizing, so the costs invested in
bargaining and decision rest on the parties’
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experiences in negotiations, their bargaining
power, the reliability of their partners and
other business factors. However, the nu-
merus clausus principle does make a differ-
ence with respect to the second part. Under
a property regime without this principle, A
and B can simply define the new right in the
watch in their contract, and label it as a prop-
erty right. Under a numerus clausus regime,
though the parties still need to enumerate the
merits of the right in their contract, they can-
not directly characterize it as a property right,
but have to design additional clauses to imi-
tate the legal effects of a property right. In
other words, the parties cannot use the term
of “property right” to identify the nature of
the new right: rather, they must elaborate on
the substance of this term in their contract.
To grant B a right in A’s watch bearing
the legal effects of a property right, the con-
tract between A and B should stipulate that
1) A is prohibited from granting a third party
any right incompatible with B’s right; 2) B
and the successors of his right can transfer
the right freely and the successors can claim
the right directly against A or his successors;
3) neither A nor any of his successors is al-
lowed to transfer A’s rights in the watch to
a third party without delegating A’s duties
under this contract; and 4) B, as well as the
successors of his right, is entitled to require
specific performance of duties provided in
1), 2) and 3). These clauses are referred to
as “clauses imitating the property effects” in
this paper.26
Of course, adding the “clauses imitat-
ing the property effects” entails costs as well.
Nevertheless, bargaining and decision costs
have already sunk significantly beforehand
to fix the parties’ material rights and duties.
Thus, the marginal cost of inserting these
clauses is relatively small. In addition, since
the effects of a property right do not shift
with the subject matter or merits of the right,
it is entirely conceivable that one can design
certain boilerplate clauses meeting the needs
of all contractual arrangements mimicking
the effect of a property right. In that case,
the marginal cost becomes even smaller.
Consequently, only minimal transaction costs
will accrue in most cases when the parties
have to add the “clauses imitating the prop-
erty effects” under a numerus clausus regime.
Between A and B, the contract itself is
sufficient to illustrate the rights and duties.
However, disclosure is necessary if a third
party needs to know the new right A con-
fers upon B. Under a non-numerus clausus
regime where the new right is designated as
a property right, the disclosure is made
through enter ing notation or  taking
possession, otherwise the bona fide purchas-
ers will not be required to honor the new
property right. Similarly, under a numerus
clausus regime, the contract creating the new
right has to be disclosed to the assignees and
delegatees of the contractual rights and
duties. In short, regardless of the nature of
the right created between A and B, its sub-
stance should always be disclosed to suc-
cessors of such right and the corresponding
duties insofar as the right and the duties are
transferable. Thus, the costs involved in dem-
onstrating the new right to third parties will
arise under both regimes.
In a decentralized disclosure system,
such costs will be the same whether or not
the property regime embodies the numerus
clausus principle: A, B may use the same
method — e.g. binding the contract to the
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watch, or attaching a label to the watch indi-
cating “B is entitled to use the watch and
please refer to B for details” — to disclose
the new right in either regime. However, in a
centralized disclosure system, the costs for
disclosure can be different under these two
property regimes because the centralized
system is applicable only to property rights,
but not to contractual rights imitating prop-
erty effects.27 With respect to originating
parties like A and B, a centralized disclosure
system might save their costs for disclosure.
A decentralized systems is probably less re-
liable and more expensive to maintain. The
label attached to the watch, for instance, may
fall off or be falsified, so the parties need to
check it frequently. By shifting to a central-
ized system, they can spend less time and
money on these checks. Nevertheless, this
states but one possibility. The scale of the
costs for disclosure tends to vary with the
substances of the rights to be disclosed. To
illustrate, imagine that there is a real cov-
enant prohibiting pets in a condominium.
Perhaps it is much cheaper to disclose this
covenant by posting it in the lobby than fil-
ing it with the real estate registry if the
homeowners have already employed
doormen, as they can take care of the post
at almost no additional cost. Generally
speaking, therefore, with a decentralized dis-
closure system, the costs for disclosure are
substantially identical under a numerus
clausus regime and one without it,28 while
with a centralized system, these costs can
be greater under a numerus clausus regime
for some rights, yet for others, a regime
without numerus clausus costs more.29
Finally, we turn to the police and en-
forcement costs and focus on the costs in-
curred by B (and his successors), the holder
of the right, in seeking legal remedies.
Presumably, there are two major types of
violators to B’s right — the owner A (and
his successors) and third parties in general.
With respect to each type, the remedial costs
further differ depending on whether the vio-
lator is in bankruptcy. So the police and en-
forcement costs should be discussed in four
separate situations.
In the first situation where the owner A
violates and is not in bankruptcy, B can al-
lege the claims out of property right and re-
quest A to restore his right under a regime
without the numerus clausus principle. To
make these claims, B only has to prove that
A does violate his right. Under a numerus
clausus regime, however, B must allege a
breach of contract and seek contractual
remedies.30 As the parties have agreed on
specific performance, normally the results
are the same no matter whether the contrac-
tual or the property remedy is sought. Also,
in the jurisdictions where res ipsa loquitur
(e.g. Japan) or strict liability (e.g. China) is
applied to the breach of contract, B’s bur-
den of proof will not be any heavier. In
general, B’s costs for seeking legal remedies
do not change to any meaningful extent un-
der either property regime, as long as he
brings suits before the statue of limitations
runs out.
In the second situation where A, the
violator, is in bankruptcy, because of the
priority of property rights, B’s claims out of
property right remain intact in a non-numerus
clausus regime. On the contrary, B’s con-
tractual right enjoys no priority in the bank-
ruptcy proceeding. His right of using the
watch on Mondays may thus be totally sub-
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verted and he may recover no more than the
damages equivalent to a fraction of the value
of this right.31 Such a result cannot be possi-
bly avoided through ex ante contractual
arrangements. Therefore, in the second
situation, the numerus clausus regime may
lead to serious frustration costs.
The third situation involves the violation
by a third party who is not in bankruptcy.
Without the numerus clausus principle, B is
entitled to a property right and may seek le-
gal remedies based on claims out of prop-
erty right. Under a numerus clausus regime,
on the other hand, B is granted a contractual
right that cannot be claimed against a third
party. Consequently, he must turn to the rules
of unjust enrichment or interference of con-
tracts for recovery.32 Yet in either the unjust
enrichment suit or the interference suit, B
will have to prove more elements, compared
with asserting the claims out of property
right, to make a prima facie case. In terms
of the remedies, injunctions may be awarded
in unjust enrichment suits, but B might
merely recover damages in tort cases. Hence,
the third situation will give rise to high frus-
tration costs as well.
Finally, when B’s right is violated by a
third party in bankruptcy, he will become an
unsecured creditor and wait for distribution
if he did not acquire a property right in the
first place due to existence of the numerus
clausus principle. By contrast, he is able to
make the claims out of property right under
a non-numerus clausus regime. Similar to the
second situation discussed above, numerus
clausus will also lead to great frustration costs
in this scenario.33
It is evident from the above analysis that
the numerus clausus regime brings about
higher policing and enforcement costs. In
particular, when the violator is in bankruptcy,
the parties’ business goals can fail completely
with the restriction laid by the numerus
clausus principle. The policing and enforce-
ment costs are the major components of frus-
tration costs resulting from the numerus
clausus principle. This is attributable to the
extreme difficulty in establishing, through
contractual arrangements, the priority com-
ing with a standard property right.34
III. Normative Implications
1. Two revelations and one puzzle
(1) Two approaches to alleviate the frus-
tration costs
The most powerful argument against the
numerus clausus principle relies on its ac-
companying frustration costs. The theoreti-
cal analysis done above reveals, nonetheless,
that the frustration costs in a numerus clausus
regime comes mainly from the different en-
forcement rules available to property rights
and contractual rights. Given this diagnosis,
we can easily find two prescriptions: either
to keep the current dichotomy in enforce-
ment rules and abolish the numerus clausus
principle, or to keep this principle but elimi-
nate the disparities in enforcement rules. In
terms of lowering the frustration costs, these
two approaches are supposed to play com-
parable roles. So to make a choice between
the two may require studies on their differ-
ences in other aspects, such as the potential
costs associated with the reform of rules,
which is beyond the scope of this paper. No
matter which approach is to be taken,
however, we can predict for sure that the
holder of the nonstandard right will always
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prevail over the unsecured creditors of the
grantor or violators of this right. In other
words, for these creditors, these two ap-
proaches lead to the same end.
(2) Rights that need to be earmarked as
property rights
The analysis in Part II indicates that the
priority of property rights cannot be easily
established by contractual arrangements, and
the policing and enforcement costs are es-
pecially high when the grantor or violator of
the novel right is in bankruptcy. Therefore,
among the rights in property, those particu-
larly sensitive to bankruptcy are most in need
of being earmarked as property rights to en-
sure their priority. A typical example is the
security interest, the essential function of
which is to create priority over other credi-
tors in a bankruptcy proceeding. There has
been a fair amount of literature advocating
more freedom to customize security
interests. The enormous transaction costs
involved in imitating the priority effect of
security interests through contracts is the key
rationale behind our support of these
arguments.
Whether to earmark a right as property
right is one thing; whether to disclose the
information of such a right through a cen-
tralized system is quite another. When mak-
ing decision on the second issue, we need to
compare the “users’ savings” from disclos-
ing through a centralize system with the sum
of the “system costs” and the “nonuser costs.”
Only if the former outweighs the latter should
a centralized disclosure system be applied.35
In terms of the assets that already have
a centralized system for disclosure, such as
real estates, the information cost externality
will not be aggravated significantly even if
new items are added to the list of property
rights. Hence, if a centralized system helps
reduce the costs for disclosing the individu-
ally tailored rights in these assets, such rights
may as well be designated as property rights,
though they are probably not so sensitive to
bankruptcy as is the security interest.
(3) Why strictly restrict property rights
in real estate
If a centralized disclosure system al-
ready exists for a certain type of assets, no
further information cost externality will ac-
crue by adding new forms of property rights.
This lends support to free customization of
property rights in that type of assets. Yet the
property rights in real estates are strictly re-
stricted in both Common Law and Civil Law
countries, although the registration systems
for real properties have been functioning, at
least in some of these countries, for centuries.
Certain historical backgrounds may account
for this conservatism,36 but do these restric-
tions still serve the needs of modern society?
They are at least unwarranted under our ana-
lytical framework. It is worth mentioning,
however, that the development of equitable
servitude in the Anglo-American legal sys-
tem does signal some compromise of nu-
merus clausus with respect to real property.37
This being said, it might still be too early to
decide whether such compromise is but an
isolated coincidence or represents an ongo-
ing retreat of the numerus clausus principle.
2. Numerus clausus and the current
Civil Law property right system
(1) Ownership
The concept of ownership refers to the
most complete property right in an asset that
can be enjoyed by a private person in a Civil
Law property system. It also serves as the
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basis for creation of the other two catego-
ries of property rights — the usufruct rights
and the security interests. We have assumed
so far that the substance of the ownership is
not subject to personalized designs. Now let
us explore the reasons for prohibiting such
designs. To customize an ownership is, in
essence, to either narrow or expand the le-
gally prescribed scope of the power of the
owner. On one hand, to narrow the scope is
effectively equivalent to giving up certain le-
gal entitlements, which is usually no big is-
sue insofar as the abandonment is made at
the owner’s free will. On the other hand,
however, the expansion of powers deserves
close observation.
First, we shall explore the problem of
efficiency. If the legally defined scope of
private ownership can be altered unilaterally,
then owners will have the potential power to
encroach upon each other’s domain of
ownership. To illustrate, suppose A declares
that the ownership of his land embodies a
right of overlooking within 3 miles. Similarly,
B, the owner of the adjacent land, announces
that his ownership includes a right of drop-
ping farm chemicals from airplanes over his
land. The law must then decide which of
these two individualized ownerships should
prevail when B’s airplane interrupts A’s
view.38 “First in time, first in right” might be
a clear-cut criterion for solving such a
conflict. In other words, whoever declares
and discloses his right first will win the game.
However, this solution is by nature a varia-
tion of the first possession rule which is be-
lieved to be inefficient as it inspires uneco-
nomic investments.39 In addition, as sug-
gested by Merrill and Smith, the second level
information cost externality will occur as a
byproduct of such free customization of
ownership. Now that A is allowed to declare
a 3-mile overlooking right, who knows that
he has not declared a 30-mile or even 300-
mile right? Consequently, any party planning
to build up a mansion or fly an aircraft within
a reasonable radius from A’s land will have
to make out the exact merits of A’s right to
avoid violation.
Secondly, allowing the free custom-
ization of ownership will directly compro-
mise the distribution standard set by law. For
example, the current rules governing the ad-
jacency relation require the landowner, A,
not to block the natural flow of ground wa-
ter coming from a neighboring piece of land,
which means that the law allocates the right
of passage of water to the neighboring
landowner, B.40 If A is free to change this
allocation of rights and forbid the water flow
from B’s land, B will have to either refrain
from draining water through A’s land or pay
A for removal of such prohibition. This way,
the distributional standard established by the
law will be overthrown. In short, if we be-
lieve that the legal rules prescribing the scope
of ownership represent the legislature’s
sense of equality, any alteration of this
scope at odds with such a sense should be
disallowed.
(2) Usufruct rights
If we allow free customization of usu-
fruct rights but do not establish a centralized
disclosure system for these rights, we will
be able to eliminate the frustration costs while
getting around the information cost exter-
nality problem. Conversely, if we strictly
implement the numerus clausus principle, for
those usufruct rights that are not expensive
to enforce or sensitive to bankruptcy, there
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erty rights because of their dependency on
priority in bankruptcy proceedings. But this
by no means requires abolishing the numerus
clausus principle for security interests. The
gist lies in diversity of collaterals rather than
free customization of the substance of se-
curity interests. This task can be well ac-
complished even under a numerus clausus
regime by gradually lengthening the list of
statutory security interests. Among those
who argue for freedom of property rights or
security interests, very few, if any, have
clarified the essence of the “freedom” they
are advocating.42
Notwithstanding our vote for diversify-
ing collaterals, we also believe that the sub-
stances and effects of security interest ought
to be strictly regulated by law. The fact that
the priority status of security interests greatly
influences the interests of third parties war-
rants the adoption of mandatory legal provi-
sions to control the externalities this is likely
to cause.43 There are other open questions
not covered by this paper, including whether
to allow the parties to choose the method of
foreclosure — judicial sale, gaining title or
appointment of receiver — when the debtor
is in default, and whether to allow the par-
ties to tailor the status of junior creditors
when the collateral is auctioned off. These
questions must be revisited if one wishes to
argue for a non-numerus clausus regime for
security interests.
IV. Conclusion
Merrill and Smith suggest that the func-
tion of the numerus clausus principle is to
lower the externalized information costs re-
sulting from free customization of new
will not be enormous frustration costs either.
If we choose to abolish the numerus clausus
principle with respect to the usufruct rights,
however, we need to strike a balance among
the “user benefits,” the “nonuser costs” and
the “system costs,” when further deciding
whether to set up centralized systems for
disclosure of individually tailored rights.
Let’s take the heavily discussed “right
of occupancy” as an example.41 The func-
tions of the “right of occupancy” are achiev-
able through many other legal mechanisms
such as trusts or third party beneficiary
contracts. So our goal is to identify the most
cost-effective one among them. The cost of
enforcing the “right of occupancy” does not
change whether it is characterized as a prop-
erty right or not, because it is a possessory
right in real property and the right-holder is
always able to assert the claims out of pos-
session for legal remedies. Thus, judging
from the police and enforcement costs, it is
unnecessary to label the “right of occupancy”
as a property right. With this being said, it
nevertheless deserves a spot in the list of
property rights, if we wish to strengthen
protection to the occupant when the home-
owner is bankrupt. Furthermore, since the
registration system already exists for disclos-
ing property rights in real estates, not only
will no information cost externality arise with
the introduction of this new property right,
but the right-holder will save disclosure costs
by registering his right as well. Therefore, it
is desirable to recognize the “right of occu-
pancy” as a new property right as far as ef-
ficiency is concerned.
(3) Security interests
As mentioned above, security interests
in particular need to be established as prop-
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forms of property rights. These costs are
thought to be imposed basically on two cat-
egories of nonusers of the idiosyncratic
property rights: those who intend to acquire
the same type of asset as the one in which
new forms of property rights are created,
and those who have no intention of dealing
with this type of asset yet have to refrain
from violating such fancies. Such a theory
does not seem to have taken into account
protections the law would afford to bona fide
purchasers. In this paper, we argue instead
that the issue of information cost externality
regarding the first type of nonusers turns on
whether the disclosure system for property
rights is centralized or decentralized. In a
decentralized disclosure system, information
costs associated with idiosyncratic property
rights are essentially internalized by their
users. By contrast, information cost exter-
nality does occur in a centralized disclosure
system. In addition, such costs as are in-
volved in managing a centralized disclosure
system are yet another component of exter-
nality attributable to customization of prop-
erty rights. As for the second category of
nonusers, we concur with Hansmann and
Kraakman that it is unnecessary to incur any
cost to investigate the merits of idiosyncratic
property rights.
On the frustration cost side, Merrill and
Smith stopped with the compromise that it
was a negative effect of numerus clausus that
might be reduced by a so-called “generative”
approach. We reasoned, however, that when
forms of property rights are strictly defined
by the law, parties desiring new rights will
be forced to achieve the same through con-
tractual arrangements, in which case the
police and enforcement costs will signifi-
cantly increase should there be a breach or
other violation of such rights by third parties.
It is this increased cost that frustrates the
parties’ intention to transact and the prob-
lem is especially severe if the breaching or
violating party is in bankruptcy.
Our study on information cost external-
ity leads to a puzzle: why are property rights
in real estate strictly restricted even when
the registration system is fully established in
both Civil and Common Law countries. As
for frustration costs, we come up with two
normative implications. The first is that there
are at least two ways to overcome frustra-
tion costs, either by abolishing the numerus
clausus principle or by unifying enforcement
rules for contractual and property rights. The
second is that among the rights in property,
those particularly expected to enjoy a pre-
ferred status in enforcement, with security
interests as a typical example, are most in
need of being earmarked as property rights
to ensure their priority.
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